Abstract: With the rapid popularity of Internet and information technology, local
Introduction
Because of dynamics and openness in cyberspace, the environmental characteristics of an information network are changing ceaselessly, and both the attacker and defender would adjust their strategies, which makes the attack-defence confront situation also constantly changing. When the attacker detects new vulnerabilities and target, he/she will adjust their attack methods and strategy. At the same time, defenders have to timely recognize the attackers' intention and the new threats in order to make an efficient decision. Literature [9] enumerates some common changes of the environmental characteristics:
1. New vulnerability or weakness is found by scanners; 2. New security event is reported by IDS; 3. Add or delete network services; 4. Reconfigure and add fireworks; 5. Modify network configuration parameter. Therefore, with the changes of the network environment, the security situation and level also transform, the old defensive security measures might become impotent. So in order to improve the dynamic response capabilities, how to identify a real-time threat situation, precisely evaluate and timely respond to a security risk has become an important and urgent issue.
Traditional methods identify and evaluate the network security threat with either alarms correlation analysis or attack graph. In [2] , in MIRADOR system Cuppens achieved alarms correlation and threat identification analysis by modelling the attack activities. He extracted a single attack activity to match its precondition and consequence, and then correlated the previous action and subsequent action. In SATA system (Security Alerts and Threat Analysis), in N i n g [5] proposed a new method of learning a multi-stage attack through a mining attack sequence to recognize the attacker's high-level strategies and predict the attack intentions. The method is easy to implement and can be used to detect new multi-stage attack strategies. Literature [12] proposed a network security situation identification and analysis system based on UCLog+. This system can find new threats and analyze the attack source by incident storage, querying and correlation.
In [6] Attack Graph is a predicted attack path by correlating vulnerabilities, threats and connectivity between hosts, and can be automatically generated by model checking algorithms. In N o e l [8] applied adjacency matrix clustering to network attack graphs for threats correlation, prediction and hypothesizing, which have quadratic complexity in the size of an attack graph. In [7] and L i p p m a n n [4] proposed NetSPA based on an attack graph and constructed by analyzing firewall rules and vulnerabilities; the tool can obtain reachability from an already compromised host to the target host, so be used to measure and maintain network security. Literature [11] presented a quantitative threat modelling method based on Attack Path Analysis (T-MAP), which quantifies security threats by calculating total severity weights of relevant attack paths for Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) systems. Literature [10] combined Object-oriented Technique to propose a vulnerability relation model based on an extended time Petri-net, and present a non-target oriented network threat analysis method based on improved Dijkstra algorithm.
In MIRADOR and SATA, threat identification and analysis is realized by extracting threat behaviours from IDS alarms to construct an attack scenario. These methods seldom consider the influence of changing the network environment and security strategy to threat behaviours. So accuracy and efficiency of threat identification cannot be ensured and subsequent threat and attack intension is difficult to deduce. The systems AG, TVA, NetSPA and T-MAP either only correlate static information including vulnerabilities, network topologies and firework rules, etc., or fail to consider the dynamic nature of the intrusion process, so neither can obtain a real-time threat state, nor dynamically evaluate and analyze threat severity.
In this paper we combine different environment factors, consider both realtime attack behaviours and response behaviours, propose a dynamical identification method for current threat state based on invasion scenario simulating. The method first correlates network topology, vulnerabilities and firewall rules, as well as attack knowledge to generate Attack State Transition Graph in [3] , and then by correlating real-time alarms from IDS constructs a Real-time Attack State Graph. This model visually describes attacker's intruding process and state transforming, depicts realtime transition of vulnerability state under the influence of attack actions and response actions. Then a current threat state is identified and perceived by matching the above static scenario and be used to threats estimation and analysis, further to predict a next threat and target. This method also provides an useful evidence and guidance for intrusion response and security decision. Finally, this method is validated in an example network environment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section defines the model for threat identification and analysis and other correlative conceptions. Section 3 presents real-time threat identification process and algorithm and also analyzes its efficiency. In Section 4 a representative virtual network environment was given to illustrate the applicability and validity of the above model and corresponding algorithm. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and gives future directions.
The network security countermeasure model is defined as an Expanded FiniteState Automata (EFSA), which is described as (1) ) , , , S is a set of final states, if
S is a set of successful states;
δ is a set of state transitions;
ρ is probability of state transition. No matter what consummate security protection technology is applied, threats always exist and vary, to completely prevent threats sounds just like walking on water. To correctly and timely master attacker's information is a key for the defender to make a response decision. By simulating the intruding process and constructing a real-time state transition scene, the defender can master the current safety situation, estimate attacker's target and predict potential threats, and then provide an important basis for proactive security defend. Definition 1. Attack State Transition Graph. Under a given system configuration and security policy, the state transition graph of network security counter measure model V is a set of directed edges including all successful attack behaviors having been dynamically detected.
Our approach depends on an explicit assumption of monotonicity, in essence, the attacker never needs to backtrack to reach the same target. Based on this assumption, ASTG never cycles. ASTG can be generated using an improved depth first search algorithm, which has been provided and validated in our previous research achievements in [3] .
Next, based on the constructed state transition graph, correlate real-time threats with the status attribute in ASTG, and correlate those happened and happening activities with the simulated intrusion route, then generate RASG. Furthermore, based on ASTG and RASG, the current security state can be identified, subsequent threats and possible paths can also be predicted, thus attack intension and target can be deduced.
Threat identification algorithms

Occurrence testing function
Set a testing function P(.) = {true, false} to mark occurrences of threat behaviors and states. If a threat behavior or state has occurred or appeared, the value of the testing function is true, otherwise false, what is more, for those threats that repeatedly occur, set a timestamp function T (.) to record the latest moment when the same alerts and attack states are detected. The two functions are defined as:
where currenttime is the present time, â is the real-time intrusion alarm.
Attack matching window
Because some attacks repeat with very high frequency, such as network probes, syn flooding and ping of death, in order to increase the efficiency of matching real-time attacks, set a time interval to correlate the real-time alarms, which is called an Attack Matching Window(AMW) and is represented by τ ∂ . All analogical attacks detected in a given τ ∂ may be considered as repeated alarms and negligible for processing. So for any two successive intrusions, there always is
Suppose that the intrusion detection devices do not leave out any alarm, when correlating the real-time threat activities with ASTG, several possible situations may happen, which is shown in Fig. 1 
Threat identification process and algorithm
The whole flow of real-time threat identification and analysis is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The major steps for real-time threat identification algorithm StateIdentification (.) are specified as follows:
Step 1. Read a new attack event x a , and in the generated ASTG M = (S A , V A ) find x a that matches x a and the state transition
Step 2. If P( x s ) = false, that is to say the precondition state of x a is not met, and x s cannot successfully transfer the next state, and then go to Step 6.
Step 3. If P( x s ) = true, and P( x a ) = true, the state transition ' ) , ( Step 5. Renew a x and the timestamp of its subsequence state ' x s .
Step 6. If detecting a new alarm after Attack Matching Window, return to
Step 1, otherwise put out RASG M .
Step 7. Search RASG M for all final states to find the state with the latest timestamp T(.) and regard it as the current state.
Experiment and analysis
Experimental network environment
Next we use an experimental network shown in Fig. 3 to verify our method. A firewall separates the external from internal network. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) monitors the network traffic between internal hosts and outside. There are four protected hosts in the internal network: Web server H 1 , clients H 2 and H 3 , Database server H 4 , whose configurations are enumerated in Table 1 .
A simulating intruder launches his attacks from host H 0 outside the firewall into the internal, whose eventual goal is to disrupt the function of H 4 and to filch data on H 4 , for which, the intruder needs root access to the database on H 4 . His attack goal can be denoted as (7) g attack = E F (privil(intruder, H 4 ) = root). Then the initial connectivity relations among all the hosts are shown in Table 2 . By associating the network configuration with attack rules, we get all available threats, whose rules corresponding to different vulnerabilities are listed in Table 3 . The probable pervading processes of an intruder are simulated by ASTG in Fig. 4 . By looking for the ASTG, eighteen different intruding paths can be obtained from the initial state S 0 to the goal state S 10 . By correlating the real-time alarms with ASTG, RASG for the experimental network is generated, shown in Fig. 5 , in which the attacker has currently reached state S 7 . From this it is easy to deduce the attack source and obtain the achieved intrusion path (S 0 , a 1 , S 1 , a 5 , S 3 , a 6 , S 7 ). Apparently, the path includes all compromised hosts and all successful attacks. Further on, based on the generated ASTG in Fig. 4 , expand forward from state S 7 , as shown in Fig. 6 , it is obvious that there are three threat activities (a 2 , a 3 , a 7 ) that possibly occurred from the current state. And from the current state, six possible subsequence paths are deduced, as shown in bold type in Table 4 . 
Conclusion
In this paper a new method is presented to overcome some defects of the existing static security defense technologies, which is unable to dynamically identify the real-time security states and threats, nor predict the impendent threats and future security situation. This method correlates the real-time threat events with a static and complete attack scenario based on ASTG constructed in a previous work, so it can recognize that network entities have been intruded and is being intruded, and also can predict the next threat and subsequent intrusion path. The identification and analysis results not only illustrate the intruding process, present the security situation and dynamic trend at macroscopic level, but also accurately identify the real-time threat location, target, and threat path at microscopic level. Meanwhile this method integrates different dynamic information obtained from different security scanning and detection devices, such as system vulnerabilities, intrusion alarms, network configuration, and so on. Thus the identified results accurately and objectively provide useful evidence and guidance for intrusion responding and security strategies decision, and embody the idea of active and dynamic defence. Our next study is to quantitatively assess real-time security threats based on recognizing real-time threats and security state.
